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ADVANCING THE CRA-USING THE CRA'S 
STRATEGIC PLAN OPTION TO PROMOTE 
COMMUNITY INCLUSION: THE CRA 
AND COMMUNITY INCLUSION 
CASSANDRA JONES HAVARD* 
INTRODUCTION 
Banks, banking regulators, and community organizations have 
spent nearly thirty years interpreting and re-interpreting the simple 
but ambiguous mandate of the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA). The statute imposes an affirmative duty requiring "regu-
lated financial institutions [ to] have continuing ... obligation[ s] to 
help meet the ~redit needs of the local communities in which they 
are chartered."l The CRA was met with much resistance and lax 
enforcement for almost a decade. Active protest from community 
groups,2 a more defined CRA exam,3 and innovative, profitable 
lending strategies,4 have resulted in a dramatic increase in commu-
nity reinvestment dollar commitments and in loans to low- and 
* B.A., Bennett College; J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of Law; Asso-
ciate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I am grateful to West-
ern New England College School of Law, Eric Gouvin, Associate Dean for Academic 
Affairs and Professor of Law at the Western New England College School of Law, for 
the invitation to participate in the symposium, and for the assistance of Margaret Solis 
and the Western New Eng/and Law Review. 
1. Community Reinvestment Act, Congressional Findings and Statement of Pur-
pose, 12 U.S.c. § 2901(a)(3) (2000). 
2. Marion A. Cowell, Jr. & Monty D. Hagler, The Community Reinvestment Act 
in the Decade of Bank Consolidation, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 88 (1992) (explain-
ing how community groups were able to halt a bank's proposed expansion by showing 
poor CRA performance). 
3. When Congress amended the CRA, the four banking agencies issued joint reg-
ulations for the first time. E.L. Baldinucci, The Community Reinvestment Act: New 
Standards Provide New Hope, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 847-52 (1996) (comparing 
the revised CRA tests measuring a bank's lending, investment, and service with the 
former twelve factors used to evaluate CRA lending). 
4. Andrew Jacobson, The Burden of Good Intentions: Intermediate-Sized Banks 
and Thrifts and the Community Reinvestment Act, 6 U.c. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 119, 135-36 
(2006) (discussing a 2000 Federal Reserve study on the performance and profitability of 
CRA-related lending, reporting that 84 percent of CRA lending is profitable). 
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moderate-income (LMI) and minority households.5 
Banks have accepted reinvestment as a means of meeting the 
convenience and credit needs of communities and preventing urban 
deterioration. Yet, implementation and enforcement of the eRA 
remain problematic. The increase in lending has created another 
trouble-less vigorous and less qualitative enforcement. In an era 
of potentially lessened accountability due to almost laissez-faire en-
forcement, the eRA can benefit from increased use of regulatory 
enforcement powers and from more standardized performance 
reports. 
The eRA is designed to make lending institutions more ac-
countable to the communities they affect. By definition, accounta-
bility requires banks to have some input from constituent 
communities. Measuring the eRA's efficacy according to out-
come-that is, the real improvement of physical infrastructures, 
maintenance of social and economic stability, and the actual influx 
of credit and investment capital into communities-is desirable. 
The dilemma presented when balancing community participa-
tion and inclusiveness while preserving as much autonomy as possi-
ble for financial institutions is the subject of this article. Part I 
discusses the eRA's explicit and implicit objectives. Part II dis-
cusses the eRA's evaluative tools: the traditional three-part test 
and the strategic eRA plan. The three-part test measures a bank's 
actual performance in service, investment, and lending. As an op-
tional way to comply with the eRA, the strategic eRA plan envi-
sions that lenders will seek community input in setting five-year 
eRA objectives.6 The strategic plan brings to the forefront the con-
flict and pressure that banks experience when community groups 
organize to halt an institution's merger or expansion plans based on 
past eRA performance. Part III discusses the potential pitfalls that 
can be produced by the eRA's obligations. Such obligations, if not 
carefully crafted, could limit the flow of capital into communities 
even from banks that are willing to reinvest. Efforts to increase 
capital must be paired with sensitivity to a community'S redevelop-
ment concerns. Vocal communities that are able to determine their 
sustainable economic need must have the opportunity to participate 
meaningfully in the funding process. The conflict between allowing 
communities to participate in shaping the bank's funding commit-
5. Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and 
its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513,569-73 (2005). 
6. See infra Part II.B. 
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ments and requiring a bank to pledge its financial support in ad-
vance is discussed in Part III. Part IV discusses the definition and 
role of community participation and outlines various ways that 
communities can be better included in a bank's reinvestment pro-
cess. The section concludes with a suggestion of factors to use in 
evaluating the level of community participation and inclusiveness. 
Part V discusses the importance of the strategic plan option to com-
munity participation. 
I. THE CRA's COMPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES 
The CRA's basic premise of making access to credit available 
across all neighborhoods is as relevant today as it was when the 
statute was passed. The CRA has evolved to have several comple-
mentary objectives: prohibiting redlining, halting community disin-
vestment, and protecting LMI borrowers. 
When Congress enacted the [CRA] in 1977 .... [t]he act easily 
could have been hailed as fundamental civil rights and business 
opportunity legislation, as the Act encouraged the fair treatment 
of potential borrowers regardless of race, ethnicity or geographi-
cal location. The CRA also expanded opportunities for the fi-
nancial industry by establishing lending criteria that opened the 
door to a significantly greater credit market. [CRA lending pol-
icy is specifically aimed at] overcoming [the ingrained] financial 
policies within the banking and lending industry that limited ac-
cess to credit and thereby wealth, based often on the race or 
ethnicity of the borrower or borrower['s] community.? 
Similarly, the CRA complements national policies designed to 
revitalize severely economically depressed communities. Access to 
affordable credit is also a consequence of community reinvestment 
lending and arguably an implicit objective. CRA policymakers rec-
ognized that the credit markets were neither competitive nor di-
verse. The CRA is a limited government intervention in the 
financial-services market meant to address issues of market failure 
and inequity. Requiring that minorities and their communities be 
included in the mainstream economy was Congress's way of ensur-
ing minimal equality of economic opportunity.8 
7. Marcia Johnson, JaPaula Kemp & Anh Nguyen, The Community Reinvestment 
Act: Expanding Access, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 89, 89 (2002). 
8. See Barr, supra note 5, at 523-24. 
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A. Prohibiting Redlining 
When passed by Congress in 1977, the CRA was a direct re-
sponse to the specifically identified practice of redlining.9 Banks 
deliberately refused to lend to communities based upon the com-
munities' racial makeup. Redlining is the historical practice of liter-
ally using a red pen to outline minority neighborhoods. IO Loan 
officers were not to make loans to applicants who lived in redlined 
areas. Lenders impermissibly used race as a determinant of 
creditworthiness without any consideration of financial risk. While 
some scholars might define redlining as an illegal practice of dis-
criminating based on geographic location, it is inconceivable that 
redlining was not race-based. Thus, the CRA is appropriately 
viewed as an anti-discrimination statute. As further evidence of the 
need to override the discriminatory practice, it is noteworthy that 
federal regulations now require that banks have a map available to 
visually display the locations of home loans that the banks have 
made.11 
As a response to race-based discrimination, the CRA ad-
dressed the disconnect between the services offered by financial in-
stitutions and the financial needs of the local communities. The 
practice of redlining was blatant. The patterns in minority neigh-
borhoods were then, and are now, consistent: an outright refusal to 
lend in minority neighborhoods; frequent denial of minority mort-
gage applications; policies of making loans only for high-minimum 
loan amounts; unusual delays in processing loans; and failure to 
give black loan applicants the same advice that is given to white 
loan applicants.12 The refusal to look at a borrower's creditworthi-
9. See Cassandra J. Havard, Synergy and Friction-The CRA, BHCs, the SBA, 
and Community Development Lending, 86 Ky. L.J. 617, 617 n.3 (1997-98) [hereinafter 
Havard, Synergy and Friction]. 
10. See Gary M. Swidler, Note, Making the Community Reinvestment Act Work, 
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 390 (1994). 
11. Patterns of residential segregation began in the United States at the behest of 
the federal government. The Housing Act of 1934 established the Federal Housing 
Authority (FHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
The National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.c. § 1701 (2000». HUD, in an initiative designed to develop hous-
ing for poor residents of urban areas, was also required by law to identify in each city 
specific areas and neighborhoods for different racial groups. There were areas in cities 
that were ineligible for federal mortgage lending because of the racial composition of 
the neighborhoods. Id. 
12. See generally Elizabeth Renuart, Toward One Competitive and Fair Mortgage 
Market: Suggested Reforms in A Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right Direction, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 421 (2003). 
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ness or qualifications was common among private lenders and the 
federal government, both of which justified collecting housing and 
demographic information in order to avoid areas of high risk. 13 
Only with federal intervention through the CRA was the redlining 
problem highlighted and then slowly addressed. 
B. Community Disinvestment 
Equally offensive as the practice of red lining was the practice 
of community disinvestment.14 Lenders refused to extend credit to 
redlined communities, but used the deposits from those communi-
ties to extend credit in other neighborhoods.15 This practice was 
contrary to congressional intent, which was arguably to require 
banks to reinvest deposits in the communities in which they re-
ceived deposits. Thirty years after the passage of the statute, how-
ever, the precise definition of "community" remains unclear. 
Congress designed the CRA to help address issues of urban 
decay and housing deterioration. By accepting deposits from eco-
nomically distressed communities and then making loans in com-
munities that were more financially more stable, banks were 
contributing to the financial decay of economically distressed neigh-
borhoods and were perpetuating a vicious cycle. Redlined neigh-
borhoods experienced a decline in net worth because there was no 
influx of capital. When mortgage loans were offered in redlined 
communities, the terms were unusually harsh and oppressive. 
Poorly performing loans reinforce the view that a community has 
poor collateral and is not creditworthy. The poor performance of 
mortgage lending in certain neighborhoods creates unstable home-
13. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 198-203; 209-13 (1985). Historical redlining has deep roots in 
the federal government. See id. at 197. Congress created the Home Owners' Loan 
Corporation (HOLC) during the Depression to help homeowners avoid foreclosure. 
See id. at 195-203, 215. In the three-year period following the Depression, HOLC pro-
vided new mortgages to one million homeowners across the country at risk of foreclo-
sure. [d. at 196. HOLC mapped neighborhoods in particular cities by identifying the 
level of security for real estate investments. Id. at 199. These maps graded neighbor-
hoods from first to fourth grade and colored fourth grade areas considered "hazard-
ous." Id. at 195-209. 
14. Craig E. Marcus, Beyond the Boundaries of the Community Reinvestment Act 
and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based Framework for Generating 
Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 728-29 (1996) (distin-
guishing community disinvestment from race-based redlining historically and noting 
that redlining now refers to both racial discrimination and disinvestment). 
15. See Willie Brown, Note, The Forgotten Type of Capital: Addressing the Social 
Capital Deficiency in the Inner City, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 527, 550 n.166 
(2004). 
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ownership rates. A spiraling decline in home ownership continues 
as potential new residents are denied the mortgage credit to 
purchase homes. The confluence of race and class is evident here, 
given that most minority communities, even today, continue to be 
areas of disinvestment. 16 
C. Protecting Low- and Moderate-Income Borrowers 
In addition to its explicit purposes, the CRA has an implicit 
purpose of financial inclusion. It is an income-sensitive piece of leg-
islation that protects all borrowers, regardless of race, who reside in 
LMI neighborhoods.17 The CRA is intended to help overcome 
market failures and discrimination. ls The CRA encourages the de-
velopment of lending criteria that would promote individual fair-
ness for borrowers and expand credit markets for banks. Implicit 
within the notion of fairer financial policies is the expansion of ac-
cess to credit and to wealth. In this regard, the CRA is a tool used 
to close the wealth gap, providing access to those who are tradition-
ally excluded from wealth-making activities and thereby addressing 
issues of poverty and deprivation. 
The need for individual equality justifies the financial inclusion 
component of the eRA. The inability to access mainstream finan-
cial products, such as bank accounts and low cost loans, makes ac-
cess to credit extremely costly. In turn, the high cost of credit and 
use of non-traditional lenders creates a cycle of financial loss and 
exclusion that leads to increased financial strain and unmanageable 
debt-a reiterative pattern with no visible end. 
Banks, as credit-providers, make loans that either create more 
barriers or eliminate the ones that exist. Financial exclusion is 
often a symptom and cause of poverty. Conversely, financial inclu-
sion encompasses the provision of appropriate financial products 
and services to groups of vulnerable people. This includes educat-
ing borrowers to provide them with the skills, knowledge, and un-
derstanding that will allow for better use of products and services. 
16. Ted Sickinger, American Dream Denied: When the Door Is Locked To Buying 
A Home, KANSAS CITY STAR, Feb. 28, 1999, at AI, available at 1999 WLNR 7447313 
(Westlaw). 
17. Mae A. Cavoli, Fair Lending Laws: The Growing Tension, 115 BANKING L.J. 
604,608-09 (1998) (distinguishing a bank's obligation to offer a variety of low-income 
loan products from the obligation to provide loan subsidies for low- and moderate-
income borrowers). 
18. See Barr, supra note 5, at 519. 
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The eRA requires that all borrowers, including LMI borrowers, 
have access to fairly priced financial products. 
Finally, the eRA is, in practice, a financial-inclusion statute. It 
requires that lenders engage in responsible lending, with every loan 
having an indirect goal of building wealth in traditionally under-
served communities. In this regard, the statute should become 
more responsive to the environment in which the financial markets 
operate. Recognizing that safety and soundness are chief concerns 
in any lending decision, the statute must advance to evaluate eRA 
compliance in a more qualitative and objective manner. Specifi-
cally, eRA must provide LMI borrowers and LMI neighborhoods 
protection from practices that steer certain types of credit to certain 
borrowers and neighborhoods. Equality of access and equality of 
opportunity are best measured in a results-based enforcement re-
gime. As argued below, the eRA should do more to ensure that 
banks are meeting discernible goals that have been embraced by 
the community. 
Opponents of the eRA argue that it is really a credit-allocation 
statute.19 They view the eRA's requirement that lending institu-
tions meet the credit needs of their LMI communities as overly re-
strictive, unnecessary, and inefficient.20 Opponents also criticize 
making credit available on favorable terms to undeserving borrow-
ers. Others assert that the eRA promotes geographically restric-
tive lending that lacks diversity because it is highly concentrated in 
one area,21 and that the eRA actually drives capital out of 
communities.22 
An examination of eRA lending records has shown this com-
plaint to be unfounded. Recent empirical studies evaluating pre-
sent lending activities in LMI and minority communities reveal the 
opposite. LMI lending is profitable?3 and racial bias in lending to 
LMI and minority communities is still prevalent.24 Thus, the lend-
19. See, e.g., Vern McKinley, Community Reinvestment Act: Ensuring Credit Ade-
quacy or Enforcing Credit Allocation?, 4 REGULATION 25 (1994), available at http:// 
www.cato.orglpubs/regulation/regv17n4/vmck4-94.pdf. 
20. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: 
An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291,295 (1993) (making an efficiency argument 
against enforcement of the eRA). 
21. [d. at 295, 324. 
22. [d. at 296. 
23. [d. 
24. African-American, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American homebuyers con-
tinue to face unprecedented levels of housing discrimination, geographic steering, lend-
ing discrimination, and discrimination in the automatic underwriting process. Giselle R. 
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ing practices that the statute aimed to redress now appear in old 
and new forms. The new regulation is not an efficient means of 
promoting low income lending because "[i]t drives capital away 
from poor neighborhoods by imposing a tax on those depository 
institutions foolhardy enough to do business In such 
communities. "25 
II. MEASURING eRA PERFORMANCE 
Banks are subject to an annual eRA examination. During that 
exam, regulators assess whether the bank is meeting the credit 
needs of the community. Regulators use either the performance-
based standard or the strategic business plan. The financial institu-
tion elects the method of assessment. 
A. The Performance-Based Standard 
In 1989, the federal banking agencies amended the eRA's as-
sessment criteria.26 Under the old regulations, banks were obli-
Finne, Strengthening Mortgage Lending Discrimination Safeguards: The Requisite Need 
for Modernizing the Community Reinvestment Act, 7 SCHOLAR 229, 231-32 (2005) (cit-
ing ERIN B. GODFREY ET AL., URBAN INST., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN 
HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE 1 HDS 2000 (2002), available at 
http://www.huduser.orgipublications/pdUPhasel_Report.pdf). Discriminatory practices 
continue that effectively discourage minorities from applying for loans or that grant 
loans to minorities "under harsh, adverse loan terms despite creditworthiness." Id. 
The federal regulatory agencies responded by adopting a policy statement describing 
the general principles the agencies will consider in identifying discriminatory practices 
in lending and violations of the FHA and ECOA. Policy Statement on Discrimination 
in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266, 18268 (proposed Apr. 15, 1994). 
25. Macey & Miller, supra note 20, at 296. 
26. "Under the final rule, a performance-based evaluation system replaces the 
twelve assessment factors previously used to evaluate the CRA performance of finan-
cial institutions. A large retail bank receives individual scores on three separate tests." 
Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 635; see Community Reinvestment Act 
Regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.22(a), 228.22(a), 345.22(a), 563e.22(a) (2006). This evalua-
tion focuses on three specific tests that measure lending, investment, and service. 
Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 635; 12 c.F.R. §§ 25.21(a)(I), 
228.21(a)(I), 345.21(a)(I), 563e.21(a)(I) (2006). Although the categories are deline-
ated, "[t]he compliance rating for each test is ... ambiguous, [and] non-numerical." 
Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 636. The following excerpt describes the 
current evaluation process. 
The lending test evaluates the bank's lending performance. Although the 
test focuses primarily on direct lending activity, a bank may also request that 
the regulatory agency evaluate its indirect lending through its investments in 
loan pools, lending consortia, and subsidiaries. The lending test also evaluates 
the bank's lending practices to determine whether they are innovative and 
flexible. 
2006] THE CRA AND COMMUNITY INCLUSION 45 
gated to ascertain community credit needs and document their 
findings to the regulators. Regulators evaluated the banks on how 
well they made that assessment.27 Under current regulations, banks 
need only collect information on community credit needs as a part 
of their own business plan development. 
Under the performance-based assessment, there is an opportu-
nity for community groups to comment on a bank's eRA compli-
ance.28 The regulators publish a quarterly list of banks to be 
examined for eRA compliance.29 This publication requirement ap-
pears to allow community groups to make their opinions known to 
banking regulators during the eRA examination process.30 
While the large retail bank has an option of using the perform-
ance test or the strategic business plan, the strategic business plan, 
as will be argued below, requires more community involvement in 
creating the bank's eRA goals, and is therefore more responsive to 
the actual fulfillment of the community's credit needs.31 
B. The Strategic Plan Option 
Banks have some flexibility in complying with the eRA under 
the strategic business plan.32 The optional compliance program al-
lows banks more "control and independence in the eRA regulatory 
process."33 It also mandates community participation in the forma-
tion of a plan.34 
A bank that elects eRA compliance under the strategic busi-
ness plan must provide a detailed statement indicating how the 
The investment test evaluates whether the bank's lending has resulted in a 
benefit to its designated assessment area. After identifying the dollar amount 
of the institution's qualified investments, which is independent of the institu-
tion's capital, the innovation and complexity of those investments is consid-
ered. The qualified investments are then considered in connection with the 
community's credit needs and the institution's responsiveness to those needs. 
Id. at 635-39 (citations omitted); see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.22(d)(3), 228.22(d)(3), 
345.22(d)(3),563e.22(d)(3). 
27. 12 C.F.R. § 228.7(a) (1997). 
28. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640-44. 
29. 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.45, 228.45, 345.45, 563e.45 (2006). 
30. See Richard D. Marsico, The New Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: 
An Attempt at Implementing Performance-Based Standards, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. 
REP. 47, 49-50 (1995). See generally 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.45, 228.45, 345.45, 563e.45; Com-
munity Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,168 (May 4, 1995). 
31. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 639-40. 
32. 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.27(c)(1), (f)(l), 228.27(c)(1), (f)(l), 345.27(c)(1), (f)(l), 
563e.27(c)(1), (f)(l). 
33. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640. 
34. Id. 
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bank plans to meet its CRA obligations.35 Furthermore, the bank 
will be evaluated under the traditional tests for the first year.36 Af-
ter the agency has approved the plan and the plan has been imple-
mented successfully, the bank may elect to forego the traditional 
CRA tests. 
The strategic business plan must be approved by the banking 
regulators prior to an examination date.37 The plan must include 
specific goals for attaining a "satisfactory" rating.38 The bank will 
receive that rating if it has substantially achieved its goals. Like-
wise, a bank cannot obtain an "outstanding" rating unless it in-
cludes in its plan specific goals to achieve one. A bank may receive 
an "outstanding" rating if it has achieved substantially all of the 
goals outlined for an outstanding rating.39 A bank that fails to meet 
its strategic business plan may choose to be evaluated under the 
traditional three-part test instead.40 
Choosing the strategic business plan option provides the finan-
cial institution with measurable, attainable goals that the institution 
itself has developed in complying with the CRA. As an indepen-
dently defined plan, the strategic plan directs the regulators' CRA 
evaluation to the identified performance goals. Choosing this plan 
for CRA compliance gives the institution the advantage of defining 
the performance measures that regulators will use in assessment. 
A strategic plan may cover a period up to five years and must 
include annual, measurable goals.41 Using this option to fulfill its 
CRA obligations, "a bank must [first] conduct informal meetings 
with the community [representatives in the designated assessment 
area] to identify [and assess the community's] credit needs."42 Sec-
ond, the bank must "establish specific, measurable goals."43 Third, 
it must "solicit formal comments from the public on the plan" 
35. Id. at 639-40. 
36. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.27(a)(3)-(4), 228.27(a)(3)-(4), 345.27(a)(3)-(4), 
563e.27(a)(3)-(4); Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 
22,168 (May 4, 1995). 
37. See 12 c.F.R. §§ 25.27(a), (e), 228.27(a), (e), 345.27(a), (e), 563e.27(a), (e). 
38. 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.27(f)(3), 228.27(f)(3), 345.27(f)(3), 563e.27(f)(3). 
39. See 12 CF.R. §§ 25.27(f)(3), 228.27(f)(3), 345.27(f)(3), 563e.27(f)(3); Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 22,169. 
40. 12 CF.R. §§ 25.27(f)(4), 228.27(f)(4), 345.27(f)(4), 563e.27(f)(4). 
41. 12 CF.R. §§ 25.27(c)(1), 228.27(c)(1), 345.27(c)(1), 563e.27(c)(1). 
42. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640 (citing 12 CF.R. 
§§ 25.27(d)(1»; see 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.27(d)(1), 345.27(d)(1), 563e.27(d)(1). 
43. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640 (citing 12 CF.R. 
§§ 25.27(c)(1»; see 12 CF.R. §§ 25.27(f)(1), 228.27(f)(1), 345.27(f)(1), 563e.27(f)(1). 
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before submitting it to the regulator.44 Finally, it must receive ap-
proval from the banking regulator.45 
The strategic business plan encourages a bank to be innovative 
in developing its community lending plans. It also encourages in-
volvement on the part of the community that the bank serves. This 
optional CRA program gives community participation a settled 
place in CRA enforcement. Previously, that participation had been 
on the back end-lenders entered into loan commitments to halt 
community protests and to obtain regulatory approval of mergers. 
Community groups are often seen as opportunists because they are 
able to hold up the regulatory approval process if no agreement is 
reached between the bank and the community group.46 The strate-
gic business plan changes the function and timing of community 
participation. The bank would consult community groups to define 
its CRA goals before submitting its plan to federal regulators. 
Although the CRA business plan gives a bank47 some choice in 
the evaluative method used to assess compliance, the examination 
still involves a significant amount of discretion on the part of the 
examiner. Therefore, approval of the plan does not mean that the 
regulatory agency will assess performance in the same way as the 
bank proposes. Furthermore, because the plan encourages innova-
tion, regulators may unconsciously resist some proposals. Thus, 
"[t]he plan's short implementation time frame, mandatory public 
disclosure, and lack of specific guidance are all disincentives to in-
stitutions from attempting a CRA strategic [business] plan."48 
III. COMMUNITY INCLUSIVENESS AND PARTICIPATION 
The CRA recognizes the critical importance of input from un-
derserved groups in the community. Thus, their involvement in 
44. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640 (citing 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 25.27(d)(2)); see 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.27(d)(2), 345.27(d)(2), 563e.27(d)(2). The publica-
tion requirement mandates that the notice be put in a "newspaper of general circulation 
in each [of its] assessment areas" for a period of at least thirty days. 12 C.F.R. 
§ 228.27(d)(2). 
45. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640 (citing 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 25.27(a)(2), 228.27(a)(2)); see 12 C.F.R. §§ 345.27(a)(2), 563e.27(a)(2). 
46. See Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, The Community Reinvestment 
Act: Questionable Premises and Perverse Incentives, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 163, 193 
(1999). 
47. The CRA requires insured depository institutions to comply with the statute's 
mandates. The CRA does not apply to non-bank financial institutions. See generally 
Baldinucci, supra note 3. 
48. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 25.27 
(1997)). 
48 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:37 
evaluating the lending performance of federally regulated financial 
institutions has become standard practice. The eRA must avoid 
marginalization of communities and their interests. "[T]he objec-
tive here [is] to design new [eRA] governance structures that en-
able [community groups] to effectively express their perspectives 
and represent the interests of these broader communities within the 
decision-making processes of [eRA lending]."49 
Enforcement of the eRA continues to struggle to get out from 
under its past, when the examination process was considered bur-
densome and opponents charged that the criteria allowed for im-
permissible credit allocation. Long ignored during the examination 
process, early eRA enforcement was considered to be arbitrary and 
inconsistent. 50 When enforcement of the eRA began, it was, ad-
mittedly, ineffective.51 The legislative goals of prohibiting redlin-
ing, promoting reinvestment, and encouraging financial inclusion 
were supported only by bank efforts and not by actual enforcement. 
Richard D. Marisco notes: 
The regulations require the federal banking agencies to consider 
the extent of the bank's lending in its community, the geographic 
distribution of its loans, and its lending to persons of different 
income levels. However, the regulations do not contain objective 
and quantitative criteria for measuring bank lending and commu-
nity credit needs, or evaluating whether the lending meets credit 
needs. Thus, despite the improvement, the regulations fall short 
of fulfilling the capital-democratizing promise of the eRA.52 
The strategic plan is a more objective measure of eRA per-
formance. As a test that establishes quantitative and objective cri-
teria, this plan maximizes the statute's potential for serving the 
needs of LMI persons. The greatest concern with setting quantifi-
able and objective criteria is that such a standard results in credit 
allocation or lending quotas. This concern has less potency when 
one realizes that the eRA contains neither a private right of en-
forcement nor monetary penalties for noncompliance. 
49. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Institutionalizing Economic Justice, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 773,801 (2000) (using this language in discussing union governance structures). 
50. See, e.g., Richard D. Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvest-
ment Act, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 269 (1993). 
51. Cf. David K. Hales, Reallocating Credit: An Economic Analysis of the New 
CRA Regulation, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 571, 588 (1996). 
52. Richard D. Marsico, Democratizing Capital: The History, Law, and Reform of 
the Community Reinvestment Act, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 723 (2004/2005) [herein-
after Marsico, Democratizing Capital]. 
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Meeting the credit needs of a community requires a fair inter-
pretation of the demographics of the community. Under the pre-
sent regulations, however, there is a disconnect between lending 
and whether it meets the lending needs of the identified commu-
nity. Including citizen participation not only democratizes the pro-
cess but also begins to challenge the dominant exclusionary 
processes.53 The economic, political, and even cultural environ-
ment begins to change whenever those affected by the process have 
greater opportunities to modify its outcome. 
Recognizing the CRA as a participatory process also lodges it 
within the sphere in which it was enacted. It represented an unfin-
ished agenda of the civil rights movement. As an interventionist 
statute designed to encourage economic equality, the CRA presents 
a legal structure that ought to promote access to credit. Any future 
course for CRA enforcement must recognize that while there are 
competing interests, the most important goal is to produce an insti-
tutional arrangement that is genuinely inclusive and participatory. 
Undoubtedly, when Congress passed the CRA, there was at 
least an implicit recognition that the existing economic and political 
power structure was deeply invested in a dominant process that de-
nied the material interests and cultural ideologies of a group of peo-
ple. Lending was blatantly anti-democratic and exclusionary in the 
very structures of internal banking governance. The CRA, along 
with other fair-lending laws, was an effort to promote more effec-
tive lending given the communities' use of the depository institu-
tions. The statute provides a way of monitoring the structures and 
procedures of internal governance that affect credit access. 
To note, as critical race theorists do, that there are "racial 
spaces" is to recognize the law's role in the production of subordi-
nation and the relationship between racial discrimination and 
class.54 The confluence of politics and economics has created an 
institutional structure that is racially, politically, and economically 
unequa1.55 
53. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collabora-
tive Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in 
Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 307-16 (2005). 
54. Racial spaces are geographical areas of economic disinvestment that are also 
void of political power. They are born of race-based discrimination. Unlike healthy 
economic communities, there is an absence of investment production. It is race-based 
discrimination that creates this circumstance. See Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of 
Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1847 (1994). 
55. See Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the "Third World" in 
International Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913, 949-50 (2000) (citing 
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Furthermore, the eRA allows economic exploitation that is 
often race-based. The federal banking agencies and other govern-
ment entities with jurisdiction over lending discrimination are not 
very aggressive in declaring loan products and services non-compli-
ant, such as in the case of predatory lending.56 Procedures should 
be much more explicit in identifying and detecting lending discrimi-
nation. As an anti-discrimination measure, the eRA should have 
evaluative tools that help to eliminate discriminatory lending 
practices. 57 
IV. STRATEGIC PLANS REQUIRING VERIFIABLE LENDER 
PERFORMANCE AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
As a matter of public policy, the future approach of the eRA 
requires a balance between the inclusion of all possible require-
ments that may enhance community lending, and the avoidance of 
changes to the initial requirements. The crucial issue becomes how 
to make the eRA more effective in the climate of modernization 
and securitization. Requiring the CRA to be more responsive to 
changing financial markets is not at odds with this. 
A key feature of the strategic plan is the inclusion of commu-
nity groups in the creation of the plan. The informal consultation 
envisioned by the plan recognizes the inherent benefit that citizen 
protests have made to effective CRA enforcement and lender ac-
countability. Allowing community groups to participate in the crea-
tion of the strategic plan recognizes the need for citizen inclusion in 
making a credit democracy.58 It also highlights the effective role 
that citizen monitors have played in making the CRA process work. 
The citizen-participation component of the strategic plan also 
has the advantage of ensuring that community concerns are heard 
in advance of the protests that have traditionally accompanied 
merger applications. The types of affirmative lending agreements 
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human Rights in International Economic Law: Locating Latinas/ 
os in the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INfER-AM. L. REV. 361 (1996». 
56. See generally Cecil J. Hunt, II, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Ra-
cially Targeted Predatory Lending Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. 
ToL. L. REV. 211 (2003) (arguing that the financial exploitation that constitutes preda-
tory lending ought to be subject to criminal prosecution). 
57. See Cassandra Jones Havard, To Lend or Not to Lend: What the CRA Ought 
to Say About Sub-Prime and Predatory Lending, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 25-27 
(2005). 
58. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Con-
sumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 
867 (2003) (discussing the costs of using the "fringe" banking system). 
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that local citizens' groups negotiate when threatening to stop or de-
lay a merger will now become an integral part of the federal regula-
tory examination process. Inclusion at this stage of the process also 
allows community groups a basis for challenging the accuracy of the 
CRA ratings that institutions ultimately receive. 
A. The Participatory Approach and eRA Lending 
Community participation in development decision-making is a 
widely accepted concept.59 The dilemma continues to be how to 
make mandated participation meaningful and truly inclusive in sub-
stantive decision-making areas. Developing a strong participatory 
structure requires a commitment to inclusive practices and a will-
ingness to alter organizational structures to meet changing commu-
nity needs.60 
The justifications for community participation are varied. 
Founded on democratic principles that correlate equality with en-
gagement, the presumption is that citizens are interested in out-
comes that affect them and will therefore make the administration 
of the affected program more efficient. The intrinsic value of the 
individual, and the potential contributions that come from collabo-
ration, also lie at the base of this theory.61 Community participa-
tion is premised on notions of government efficiency, citizen 
democracy, and, more recently, the notion of empowerment for af-
fected communities.62 Inherent in the theory that includes partici-
pant communities in the decision-making process is the notion of 
redistribution of power.63 
59. Federal law mandates community participation in other areas, such as devel-
opment, land-use planning, and environmental management. In international develop-
ment, community participation is commonplace. See Tania Kaiser, Participation or 
Consultation? Reflections on a "Beneficiary Based" Evaluation of UNHCR's Pro-
gramme for Sierra Leonean and Liberian Refugees in Guinea, in June-July 2000,17 J. 
REFUGEE STUD. 185, 186 (2004). 
60. Developing and sharing the power base in participatory research requires 
striking several delicate power balances-the inter-group dynamics, how to best use the 
suppliers of knowledge, and the effective use of the acquired knowledge. 
61. See generally Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 
53 EMORY L.J. 433 (2004) (discussing the participative process and ways to improve 
citizen participation). 
62. Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic 
Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 297-98 (1999) (arguing that economic-devel-
opment policy must address structural barriers to community participation). 
63. See generally Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review 
of Campaign Reform, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663 (2004) (discussing democratic par-
ticipation in the context of campaign financing); Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, 
The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and 
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Promoting participatory approaches is consistent with both the 
process of making loans and the goals of the eRA. To the extent 
that eRA lending encourages development in LMI communities, 
there must be a process that is both accessible and accountable to 
those communities. Participatory approaches, in general, are recog-
nized for their effectiveness in allowing communities to identify 
their own priorities and influence policy.64 
Perhaps the most significant advantage of this approach as it 
relates to lending is the access that banks have to "inside expertise" 
that, in effect, substitutes for transaction costS.65 The direct experi-
ence of living in a community that is underdeveloped in meeting the 
service and housing needs of its residents provides essential infor-
mation that can help shape lending criteria and decisions. Such an 
effective use of the participatory approach marries policy with prac-
tice and allows the third-party recipients of the eRA lending-the 
members of the community-to have an essential stake in the pro-
cess. Thus, as a form of joint inquiry, a participatory approach in-
volves those who have both direct and indirect stakes in the 
outcome. 
Yet another benefit from a participatory approach is that it 
provides a basis for monitoring and evaluating the outcome. As 
discussed below, the strategic plan option can help reduce the com-
plexity of complying with the bank's eRA goals and provide a set-
tled guide on the policy interventions needed to achieve them. 
B. Establishing Verifiable Community Lending Needs 
To have meaningful community inclusion, there must be a 
community definition process and a significant level of community 
involvement.66 The two most important considerations of commu-
nity definition are group self-identification and the criteria for in-
clusion. Definition of the group should come from the participants 
who are able to choose the factors that are significant for inclusion. 
the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1083, 1089-90 (1999) (discussing redistrib-
utive theory in general). 
64. See generally Thomas F. McInerney, Law and Development as Democratic 
Practice, 38 VAND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 109 (2005) (discussing participatory governance). 
65. See Amy C. Bushaw, Small Business Loan Pools: Testing the Waters, 2 1. 
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 197, 216 (1998) (explaining that prohibitive costs deter 
small businesses from seeking their own investors independently of organized financial 
structures such as banks). 
66. See Sean T. McAllister, Note, Community-Based Conservation: Restructuring 
Institutions to Involve Local Communities in a Meaningful Way, 10 COLO. 1. INT'L 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y 195, 202-03 (1999). 
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Among the criteria for inclusion are spatial and non-spatial inter-
ests, and resource identification and dependence.67 The wider the 
interests of the group, the more representative the group can be in 
handling the burdens and benefits of the project. 
A eRA participatory group should avoid producing a process 
that guarantees only procedural fairness. Instead, the community 
group must be given significant levels of involvement through the 
process. The more vibrant the community group is, the more help-
ful it can be in identifying its needs and wants, thereby gaining from 
the process. There must be "ownership" of some part of the pro-
cess; some part of the decision-making process must be the exclu-
sive domain of the community group. 
Defining "community" under the eRA when using the strate-
gic business plan, therefore, means that the institutional capacity of 
the community group is recognized and well-used. Making the 
eRA evaluation less subjective and more standardized will accom-
plish this goal. Specifically, regulators evaluating lending in the fi-
nancial institution's community or defined assessment area must 
qualitatively evaluate lending based on volume of deposits, minor-
ity population, average income levels, and type of loans.68 This 
type of evaluation requires regulators and the financial institution 
to use Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)69 data in a manner 
that requires accountability. It combines the features of the already 
recognized strategic plan with the use of HMDA data to allow the 
option of the creation of a strategic plan "plus." The effect is for 
the institution to have a plan that becomes the focus of the eRA 
examination process. It also will require more verifiable lender 
performance. 
A more stringent strategic plan is needed. A modified strate-
gic business plan can concentrate on the lending and investment 
tests by making commitments to individual communities and pro-
viding more detailed reporting of their lending activities within 
specified markets. Financial institutions demarcate their assess-
ment areas, which are not necessarily tied to the geographicalloca-
tions of the particular banks. The assessment area must be one that 
serves LMI persons, small businesses, small farms, or designated 
rural areas.70 This approach is actually an effective way of integrat-
67. Id. at 207. 
68. Community Reinvestment Act-Community Development, Assigned Rat-
ings, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,257, 69,260 (Nov. 24, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563e). 
69. 12 U.S.c. §§ 2801-2809 (2000). 
70. See Richard D. Marsico, Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act: An Ad-
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ing LMI lending into the bank's mission and is a crucial part of its 
business strategy.11 The lender follows sound lending policies and 
directs capital as identified by community conditions. 
Lending and investment would continue to be conducted in 
communities that are underserved. Effective use of statistical data 
can be useful in closing the access-to-credit gap in these communi-
ties. The strategic plan "plus" also puts critical HMDA data to use 
in a meaningful way. If financial institutions are required to use 
HMDA data, along with input from community groups, as an indi-
cator of immediate community needs, the bank's eRA perform-
ance can be consistently responsive, rather than responding to 
community needs only when a pending merger is challenged. 
To avoid the considerable flexibility that is inherent in the stra-
tegic plan, regulators will need to provide specific guidance on the 
expected measures of performance.72 By identifying a community 
to serve, financial institutions choose to serve low- to moderate-
income individuals and small businesses across the United States. 
Regulators can verify the eligibility of the identified individuals and 
communities. Regulators can also focus upfront on an institution's 
compliance with fair-lending statutes and evaluate eRA loans for 
credit practices that will harm these communities, such as predatory 
lending. 
By integrating statistical information, the strategic plan "plus" 
will give community groups a means to assess information about 
lending to low- to moderate-income and minority borrowers and 
neighborhoods, small businesses, small farms, and rural area desig-
nations. There is also the added benefit that all of the loans in the 
strategic plan "plus" will be examined. In contrast, under the rou-
tine geographical assessment, eRA loans made outside of the geo-
graphical assessment area are not examined. 
The current criticism of the strategic plan approach is that reg-
ulators have been slow to approve the plans submitted for review. 
The approach is labeled burdensome and inefficient. Because the 
strategic plan "plus" allows for lending and investment outside of 
vocate's Guide to Making the CRA Work for Communities, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 
129,141-42 (2000) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 25.22(b)(I)-(5) (2000». 
71. See, e.g., Marsico, Democratizing Capital, supra note 52, at 720. 
72. See FDIC, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: GUIDE TO DEVELOPING THE 
STRATEGIC PLAN, ATTACHMENT TO FIL-26-98, at 5 (1993), available at http://www.fdic 
.gov/news/news/financiaU1998/fil9826b.pdf (providing general factors, not all of which 
would apply to each institution). 
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the bank's "community," it is arguably not as effective a reinvest-
ment tool as one that ties bank deposits to the community. 
C. Evaluating Verifiable Community Participation 
As discussed above, the informal citizen participation required 
by the strategic plan brings citizen's groups into the examination 
process earlier. Banks should also find it more satisfactory because 
it should halt meritless challenges when an institution is seeking ap-
proval for a merger, because the institution's goals and objectives 
have been pre-defined. Finally, effective inclusion requires some 
neutral review of the substantive and procedural aspects of creating 
the plan. Criteria to resolve disputes and get issues to the forefront 
are crucial. 
V. STRATEGIC OPTION PLAN AS A TYPE OF 
PARTICIPATORY ApPROACH 
Given the CRA's implicit objective to provide credit access to 
LMI borrowers and neighborhoods, it is only equitable to require 
discern able goals that are identified and embraced by the expecta-
tions of a given underserved community. The CRA, as legislation 
rooted in the social history of the 1960s, demonstrates a marked 
turn in the direction of most economic and governmental redevel-
opment programs by requiring participatory democracy. The 
CRA's history has shown a steady progression toward a more active 
and, more importantly, strategic participation by those who live and 
own businesses in a bank's "community." Implicit, again, within 
the statute is the notion that community home and business owners 
are stakeholders. The validation of the expertise of local communi-
ties in the policy debate allows them to lay claim to the internal 
agenda of reinvestment that most often separates their concerns 
and issues. 
The participatory approach underlies the strategic plan option 
of the CRA. It is an approach modeled on democratic principles.?3 
Sharing of power in a participatory regime is more than obligatory. 
Promoting a more participatory approach requires a different type 
of effort. Under the current regime, banks often meet with commu-
nity groups to determine the community's needs. However, those 
73. The participatory approach is a concept that is well-recognized in develop-
ment law and is often used in international law. See generally Pritha Gopalan, The Role 
of NGOs: Charity and Empowerment: The Trust Factor in Participation and Social Edu-
cation, 554 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 178 (1997). 
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banks are not required to view the community as an equal partici-
pant. A more defined participatory approach directs the bank to 
recognize and highlight community assets and strengths, with com-
munity members being seen as equal participants and serving as ca-
pable advisors and experts. 
It also requires banks to develop a mechanism addressing the 
community's needs by determining whether they are providing ef-
fective service to disinvested communities. While some of this can 
be done by making use of existing community structures, an effec-
tive approach requires building and maintaining respecting, trusting 
relationships within and across the community. As many are al-
ready doing, this approach depends on developing relationships 
with opinion leaders in the community. 
It is the ability to sustain relationships with community groups 
and leaders that is the hallmark of any participatory approach. In 
this regard, the challenge is to have banks share, in a meaningful 
way, the power structure involved in issues surrounding reinvest-
ment. A meaningful participatory approach requires that the com-
munity groups understand the local power structure and the issues. 
Making banks assume responsibility for the effectiveness of mean-
ingful community participation is important to the disempowered in 
the community. Effectiveness can be achieved if the bank's clear 
status and relationship with the community can command resources 
for a long-term commitment. 
A participatory approach is most important for the measure of 
trust that it imparts between the bank and the community group. 
Many complaints based on communication gaps and a failure to re-
ceive information can be avoided, thus eliminating the need for 
groups to become suspicious as to whether the planned reinvest-
ment is in the communities' best interests. 
Admittedly, one of the downsides of this approach is that it 
may require a bank to make contacts with and develop programs 
for more than one community group. Developing increased incen-
tives will most likely make for more committed communities in the 
long run. Again, it is important to think about how the power is 
shared as an incentive to sustained community involvement and 
participation. 
CONCLUSION 
Banks now face the task of balancing community participation 
and inclusiveness while at the same time preserving as much auton-
2006] THE CRA AND COMMUNITY INCLUSION 57 
omy as possible in setting eRA obligations. The eRA must adapt 
to the changing financial environment and yet remain viable as a 
statute that prohibits discrimination, encourages community rein-
vestment, and protects LMI borrowers. Predictions from bankers 
that the eRA is too risky and unprofitable have not been borne 
out. In their stead have been programs that have resulted in inno-
vative and profitable lending. Implementation and enforcement of 
the statute remain integral goals of securing credit for all economic 
segments of our country. But now the advancements must go fur-
ther to embrace the statute's implicit and explicit goals and to keep 
pace with fast-changing financial products and markets. 
